As the title implies, the new Iowa Caucuses are not the old Iowa Caucuses. The DNC is slowly smothering the Democratic precinct caucuses, but with no contest on the Democratic side in 2024, virtually no one noticed. On the Republican side, the contest for 2024 was unusual to say the least. An indicted former president (91 criminal indictments in three jurisdictions) led the field throughout the caucus cycle, but there was a question about the strength of his support (largely based on concerns about “electability”). As we found out on January 15, despite record cold temperatures, Trump supporters turned out in droves relative to his two main competitors (DeSantis and Haley). Iowa’s old, white, evangelical, Republican voters (Trump’s base) did not have any trouble showing up on a really cold, snowy Iowa evening for an hours-long event (which is the essence of a “caucus”). Perhaps this should not have been any surprise. If Trump’s base is as fervent as some suggest, they will make any effort to demonstrate their loyalty to their leader.
Nevertheless, turnout at the caucuses was lower than average (albeit the weather likely played some role), and with such a small slice of the Republican electorate participating (to be clear, Trump did receive over 56,000 votes), questions about Iowa’s role as “first-in-the-nation” on the GOP side are likely to continue into the 2028 cycle. The real race was for second place, and it came down to Haley and DeSantis. DeSantis had the most institutional support of Iowa Republicans (those in leadership positions in state government), but would such support and strong organizational presence matter? This is one of a handful of questions caucus observers were looking to have answered on caucus night. Indeed, for all the talk about the end of the Iowa Caucuses, the 2024 GOP caucuses may end up playing an even more outsized role than they have in recent memory.
To start, for the first time in caucus history, Iowa’s governor endorsed a candidate when Governor Kim Reynolds announced on November 6, 2023, that she was endorsing Florida Governor Ron DeSantis. Not only was this move unprecedented in caucus history, but it set up an interesting dynamic for likely Republican caucus-goers in the state. According to recent polling, Governor Reynolds and Donald Trump remain enormously popular among Iowa Republicans, suggesting there were a sizeable number of caucus-goers who approved of Governor Reynolds, and perhaps indirectly DeSantis, but ended up caucusing for Donald Trump. Political scientists have long noted the difficulty of quantifying the effect of endorsements, but the 2024 cycle provides an interesting test case in this regard, particularly given the competing allegiances among caucus-goers.
Second, as noted earlier, one of the big questions heading into caucus night was the race for second place. As close observers of the Iowa Caucuses know, this event is all about the “expectations game.” A candidate does not have to win on caucus night to get a boost coming out of the state; he or she simply needs to exceed expectations. In 1984, Democrat Gary Hart finished a distance second (over 32 points) behind caucus winner Walter Mondale with just 16.5 percent support in state delegate equivalents. But, this finish was “better than expected” against national frontrunner Mondale and gave the Hart campaign a boost it would use to run on in 1988. The same can be said for George McGovern in 1972, though McGovern would use that finish to ultimately win the nomination.
Donald Trump also finished second in 2016 before becoming the nominee. While his second-place finish was initially viewed as a potential sign of weakness in the campaign, his organizational presence in the state prior to the caucuses was minuscule compared to his competitors, a point we return to below. In 2024, it was Trump, the national frontrunner, who ironically did better than expected by eclipsing the 50 percent mark and setting the record for support in a competitive caucus. For DeSantis and Haley, however, in the days following the caucus, the two campaigns were forced to push back against headlines that they “failed to meet” expectations.
Third, caucuses, historically, are low-turnout events (approximately 18 percent of active registered Republicans showed up on January 15th), but because detailed lists of who participates in the caucuses are kept secret by the parties, we do not know how well the participants on caucus night reflect the overall preferences of the party. (Campaigns purchase these lists at a considerable cost, but the lists remain unavailable to scholars for research purposes.) The 2024 caucuses have provided another data point, albeit incomplete, about how party-run events, dominated by party activists, shape the nomination process and potentially provide another clue about whether those who participate in such low-turnout events reflect party members more generally.
Finally, the adage that “you have to shake a candidate’s hand seven times before you will caucus for that person” is again being challenged. This was nearly upended in 2016 with Trump’s second-place finish despite his lack of physical or organizational presence in the state. Going back to Jimmy Carter’s unexpected second-place showing in 1976 (“Uncommitted” actually won), the rule has been that retail politics matter in Iowa, that candidates have to be here early and often to convince voters to show up on cold caucus nights. DeSantis and Haley certainly bought into this strategy in the 2024 caucus cycle, but Trump’s presence was still considerably less (albeit greater than in 2016). So, given the record-breaking strength of Trump’s victory in 2024, once again, we are left wondering how much retail politics actually matter, particularly in an era where subnational politics are consumed by national politicking.
To sum up, 2024 was potentially quite the swan song for the Iowa Caucuses. While attention nationally has moved on from Iowa and the caucus system generally, as analysts begin to dissect the results from the 2024 Iowa Caucuses, the data have the potential to answer not only fundamental questions about the democratic process but also about how the race for the Republican nomination and, ultimately, the race for president in 2024, will look and feel.
Christopher W. Larimer, Ph.D. and Donna R. Hoffman, Ph.D.
Professors, Department of Political Science — University of Northern Iowa
